CMSC 848N / WEEK 11, LECTURE 2

# Defense in Depth

## Model defenses, tool permissions, and recovery

Furong Huang

# Agent security depends on decisions and permissions

A model can make an unsafe choice. The surrounding system decides whether that choice takes effect.

## The model chooses

What to say

Which action to propose

## The system permits

Which tools may run

Which data may leave

**A safer model and restricted authority protect different parts of the system.**

# Today’s questions

01 Where can an attacker influence an agent?


02 How can we improve the model’s decisions?

03 Which actions should the runtime allow?

04 How do we evaluate failures and recover?


# Attacks can enter at different stages of the lifecycle

Poisoned training data, malicious external content, and unsafe tool use require different controls.



# A compromise can begin before the user's task

AdvBDGen illustrates how poisoned alignment data can install a trigger that activates later.




**Attack setting: the attacker can influence alignment data.**

Pathmanathan et al., AdvBDGen, AAAI 2026, Fig. 1 (diagram). https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/41118


# Safety tests should include errors and retries

PropensityBench tests choices when tools fail and messages urge the agent to finish.

The allowed tool fails.

A prohibited tool remains available.

The agent can still refuse.




**Percentages are among misaligned calls, not all scenarios. Tools are simulated.**

Sehwag et al., PropensityBench, arXiv:2511.20703v1, Fig. 19. https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.20703v1


# Each defense needs a clear control point

| Control point | What it changes |
| --- | --- |
| Model response | Which answer or token the model prefers |
| Instruction boundary | Which content may direct the task |
| Tool execution | Which operations and data flows are allowed |
| Monitoring and recovery | What we observe and how we limit damage |

Synthesis of GenARM, AegisLLM, StruQ, CaMeL, Progent, and NIST SP 800-61r3.

# Reward guidance can steer a model during generation

GenARM combines the base model's score with a learned next-token reward score.





**The generator stays fixed. The autoregressive reward model requires training.**

Xu et al., GenARM, ICLR 2025, Fig. 1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08193v5

# Reward models can learn from their scoring mistakes

REFORM searches for responses the reward model scores incorrectly, then adds them to its training data.





**The diagram illustrates reward correction; it is not a measured accuracy plot.**

Pathmanathan and Huang, REFORM, ACL 2026, Fig. 2. https://aclanthology.org/2026.acl-long.418/

# Safety guidance can also apply to multimodal models

Immune uses a safety reward to guide generation under multimodal jailbreaks.





**MM-Vet measures visual-task performance. Lower attack success and higher task performance are better.**

Ghosal et al., Immune, CVPR 2025, Fig. 1 (right). https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.18688

# Early feedback can redirect unsafe reasoning

SafeThink checks partial reasoning and adds a short safety prefix when the score falls below a threshold.




**The safety score can be wrong. The method needs access to intermediate reasoning.**

Ghosal et al., SafeThink, Fig. 1(a). https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11096v1

# Checks before and after generation catch different errors

AegisLLM screens the query, generates a response, and evaluates the response before release.





**Figure** 1: System architecture and workflow of AegisLLM.

**These checks use models. They do not enforce tool permissions.**

Cai et al., AegisLLM, ICLR 2025 BuildingTrust workshop, Fig. 1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.20965v2

# A safer system must still answer legitimate questions

AegisLLM evaluates jailbreak resistance alongside benign-query compliance and refusal.

| Method | StrongREJECT ⇓ | PHTest | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | compliance ⇑ | full refusal ⇓ |
| Base (No Defense) | 0.078 | 85.8% | 7.1% |
| Refusal-VPI [Link] | 0.177 | 87.4% | 12.0% |
| LLM-LAT Robust [Sheshadri et al., 2024b] | 0.021 | 39.2% | 49.6% |
| Circuit Breaker [Zou et al., 2024] | 0.022 | 40.3% | 50.9% |
| Llama Guard 3 [Inan et al., 2023] | 0.039 | 80.2% | 13.9% |
| Self-Examination [Phute et al., 2023] | 0.030 | 49.0% | 46.0% |
| Self-Reminders [Xie et al., 2023] | **0.015** | 32.6% | 55.7% |
| **AegisLLM (Ours)** | 0.038 | **88.5%** | **7.9%** |

**Llama-3-8B. StrongREJECT is a score, not an ASR percentage. Partial refusals are omitted.**


Cai et al., AegisLLM, Table 4. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.20965v2

# A quick safety check can decide when a stronger check is needed

Constitutional Classifiers++ evaluates the request together with the response.

Screen every exchange with a cheap probe.

Send flagged cases to a stronger classifier.





**Static CBRN attacks, calibrated to 0.1% benign refusal. Lower attack success and compute are better.**

Cunningham et al., Constitutional Classifiers++, Fig. 3(c). https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.04603v1

# Training can improve resistance to injected instructions

SecAlign prefers answers that follow the legitimate task over answers that follow the injection.




**This changes model weights. Resistance remains empirical.**

Chen et al., SecAlign, CCS 2025, Fig. 1 (top). https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.05451v3

# The interface should distinguish instructions from data

StruQ combines a structured input format with training that respects that format.






Figure 1: Existing LLM-integrated applications send the prompt and data as a single unit, so instructions injected into the data are a serious threat. The prompt and data are supplied separately in StruQ, making it more robust to prompt injections.

**Delimiters alone are insufficient. The method also trains the model.**

Chen et al., StruQ, Fig. 1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06363v2

# Untrusted content should not rewrite the agent's plan

CaMeL separates planning from processing untrusted content and checks the resulting data flows.





**Protection depends on the security policy, tracked flows, and implementation.**

Debenedetti et al., CaMeL, Fig. 5 (diagram). https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18813v2

# The runtime checks permissions before tools execute

Progent checks each tool call against a policy before execution.




**Email blocked**

**Slack allowed**

**Every relevant tool call must pass through the runtime check.**

Shi et al., Progent v3, Fig. 1, proposed tool calls at steps 4–5 (cropped excerpts). https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.11703v3


# Defense layers address different failures

| Defense | What it addresses | What still needs protection |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GenARM, Immune, AegisLLM | Unsafe generated responses | Tool authority and external effects |
| SecAlign, StruQ | Following injected instructions | Attacks outside their tested interface |
| CaMeL, Progent | Unauthorized flows or tool calls | Policy gaps and harmful actions the policy allows |
| Monitoring and response | Missed violations and ongoing harm | Blind spots, delayed action, and recovery |

Synthesis of the cited methods. This compares their scope, not their ranking.

# What a monitor can see affects what it can detect

In Baker et al., reasoning visibility reveals coding reward hacks missed by an action-only monitor.





**Specific coding reward hacks. Abrupt drops follow manual environment patches.**

Baker et al., Monitoring Reasoning Models, Fig. 2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11926v1

# Optimizing a monitor score can change how failures appear

Penalizing visible cheating can leave some cheating that the monitor no longer catches.





**CoT-only monitor with a non-frontier agent. Independent checks detect test tampering.**

Baker et al., Monitoring Reasoning Models, Fig. 4. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11926v1

# Evaluation checks both the user's task and the attacker's goal

AgentDojo measures task completion and attack success in a tool-using environment.




**Stopping the attacker is not enough if the user's task also fails.**

Debenedetti et al., AgentDojo, Fig. 1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352v3

# A defense result depends on the tested threat model

| Specify | Why it matters |
| --- | --- |
| Attacker access | A prompt attacker differs from a poisoned-data attacker |
| Knowledge and budget | Adaptive search can find failures missed by one fixed attack |
| Attack success | Unsafe text, attempted calls, and actions that take effect differ |
| Benign tasks and cost | Security gains may reduce utility or require more computation |

Synthesis of the cited defense and evaluation papers.

# A fixed attack can miss failures found by adaptive search

The Attacker Moves Second tests attacks that adapt to the defense's responses.

| Defense | Model | Utility | Static ASR | Search Attack ASR | Median Num. Queries |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| None | Gemini-2.5 Pro | 74.23% | 30% | 100% | 13 |
| | GPT-5 Mini | 72.16% | 0% | 75% | 58 |
| | Llama-3.3 70B | 56.70% | 35% | 100% | 14 |
| | MetaSecAlign 70B | 73.20% | 5% | 96% | 37 |
| Spotlighting | Gemini-2.5 Pro | 75.26% | 28% | 99% | 14 |
| | GPT-5 Mini | 76.29% | 0% | 47% | 73.5 |
| | Llama-3.3 70B | 39.18% | 28% | 99% | 14 |
| | MetaSecAlign 70B | 68.04% | 1% | 99% | 37 |

**Up to 800 queries per scenario; query medians include successful searches only. CaMeL was not tested.**

Nasr et al., The Attacker Moves Second, Table 7 (upper excerpt), CC BY 4.0. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09023v1

# Detection needs a clear response

An alert is useful only if someone or something can act on it.

01 Pause the risky operation when the signal warrants it

02 Assign an owner to assess impact and scope

03 Protect the monitor and its records from the agent

NIST SP 800-61r3. Agent-specific application.

# Incident response must limit harm and retain evidence

Containment decisions should consider both ongoing damage and the evidence they may destroy.

| | |
|---|---|
| **RS.AN-06** | Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved |
| **RS.AN-07** | Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved |

**There is no universal minute-by-minute order for every incident.**

NIST SP 800-61r3, Table 3, RS.AN-06 and RS.AN-07 (descriptions). https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3

# Recovery includes restoring service and improving the system

No new alerts does not mean the system is safe to restart.





**Fig. 2. Incident response life cycle model based on CSF 2.0 Functions**

**Official incident-response framework, applied here to agent systems.**

NIST SP 800-61r3, Fig. 2. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3

# Changes to the agent can change its security behavior

Recheck the assumptions affected by a model, prompt, tool, or memory update.

01 Verify where updates came from and keep rollback versions

02 Repeat relevant attacks and benign-task tests

03 Check permissions, monitoring, and external effects

SLSA v1.2: https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.2/ | in-toto: https://in-toto.io/ | NIST SP 800-61r3.

# The research challenge is to protect the whole system

01 How do defenses fail together under adaptive attacks?

02 Can useful agents operate with less authority?

03 Does protection persist after the agent changes?

**Evaluate the combined system, including the cost of mistakes and restrictions.**

Research questions motivated by the cited methods and evaluation studies.

# Safer decisions and restricted authority work together

01 Improve how the model responds to unsafe or misleading inputs

02 Enforce permissions before consequential actions

03 Observe failures and retain a practical recovery path

**A defense claim should identify the part of the system it protects.**